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Ask almost anyone today whether we live in a more globalized 
economy and you will likely hear, “Of course we do, the world is 
‘smaller’ today than a century ago.” While I agree that countries inter-
act much more than in the past, many do not appreciate the history of 
that process, tending to characterize the increased globalization through 
trade, fi nance, and migration as novel. I begin this chapter by discussing 
economic history for a number of countries, over different time periods, 
and concerning different facets of globalization. 
My goal is to convey three basic points concerning the world econ-
omy. The fi rst is that globalization—sometimes referred to as economic 
integration—is not so new. If we look more carefully at the evidence 
surrounding us we fi nd that the intermingling of people located in dif-
ferent corners of the globe along with their economic interactions is not 
unique to the present period. People and goods have crisscrossed the 
globe for centuries, leaving behind changes in commerce, technology, 
culture, and know-how. 
The second point is that while the globalization process has been 
taking place for some time, it does in several respects manifest itself 
differently today. Facets of globalization and economic integration that 
we observe today do differ in important ways from what we observed 
in the past. These differences are due in part to dramatic technological 
advances that have taken place with respect to transportation and com-
munication. These advances have drastically reduced prices and have 
expanded in many dimensions the modes that can be availed of to trans-
port people, goods, and information. 
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The third point is with respect to globalization’s impact on eco-
nomic development. While it is often claimed that globalization disad-
vantages the less fortunate, causing labor dislocations and increasing 
income disparities around the globe, it is also the case that globalization 
through migration can be a powerful force with the potential to signifi -
cantly improve the lot for out-migration communities in many areas of 
the globe (Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007). It is this facet of globaliza-
tion—the spread of international migration—upon which this chapter 
ultimately focuses. 
GLOBALIZATION IS NOT SO NEW
Countries interact with each other in a number of ways—through 
trade in goods and services, by borrowing and lending fi nancial assets, 
and by migration. While this chapter focuses on international migration 
as it relates to globalization and economic development, it begins with 
a detour into more familiar and established territory for most readers. I 
fi rst present data on globalization as measured by the share of interna-
tional trade in GDP—an openness index. This particular index or one 
of its close variants is what researchers usually cite when making the 
case that the world is much more integrated today, that economies today 
interact substantially more with each other relative to the past. 
The notion that globalization is of recent vintage probably origi-
nates from the analysis of an openness index relative to its value 50 or 
60 years ago. For example, take the case of the United States. Figure 3.1 
shows the ratio of U.S. international trade fl ows (U.S. exports plus U.S. 
imports) to U.S. national income (GDP) since 1945. The graph clearly 
suggests that international trade (as a share of GDP) was relatively level 
to 1970 and then consistently grew. Diagrams such as the one plotted in 
Figure 3.1 are the basis of the general perception that the U.S. economy 
was fairly closed economically with respect to the rest of the world until 
fairly recently. 
By contrast, an examination of Figure 3.2, where this same series is 
plotted from 1870 to the present, provides us with an entirely different 
impression. What emerges from this broader timeline of U.S. economic 
history is that today’s relatively high fraction of trade in U.S. GDP is 
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neither unique nor new. In 1916 merchandise trade as a share of GDP 
was 19.7 percent, exceeding the 18.9 percent share observed in 2001. 
The plot suggests that the argument that globalization is new is gener-
ally derived from an examination of data since World War II. But if 
we instead peer further back, a totally different picture emerges. We 
observe relatively low trade fl ows during and surrounding the interwar 
period (World War I through World War II). The interwar period and 
period immediately surrounding it with its relatively low share of trade 
in GDP appear as an exception to the rule. Both before and after that 
period, international trade played larger roles in the U.S. economy.
It is understandable that researchers tend to analyze economic fl ows 
since World War II, generally disregarding or shying away from eco-
nomic data series prior to the interwar period. Since World War II, gov-
ernments and international organizations have become more interested 
in collecting economic data in a systematic and consistent manner.1 
International organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, 
the OECD, and the International Monetary Fund have expended con-
siderable effort and resources to facilitate and coordinate the collection 
of data so that economic information is readily available and compa-
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rable across countries and over time.2 Consequently, series since World 
War II have become more reliable, tempting researchers to restrict their 
research to the analysis of recent data, or at a minimum, the post–World 
War II period. There are drawbacks, however, to limiting our analysis 
to more recent data. We fail to appreciate important changes and turning 
points in the time series of fl ows, compromising our understanding of 
economic activity both in the short and long run. 
Yet another picture emerges of globalization through trade if we 
examine a century of data for Argentina. Figure 3.3 displays an index 
of openness obtained by expressing the sum of Argentina’s exports and 
imports as a share of GDP. While total merchandise trade was equal 
to about half of Argentina’s GDP at the turn of the last century (i.e., in 
1900), Argentina’s trade accounted for less than one-fi fth of GDP in 
2000. Using simple indexes of openness, Argentina appears less global-
ized today relative to yesterday. In the Southern Cone, globalization 
through international trade has faltered rather than grown. 
Misconceptions regarding the globalization of economies through 
migration also arise if we similarly limit ourselves to analyzing recent 
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data on migration. U.S. data on the percentage of the U.S. population 
that is foreign born is presented in Figure 3.4. These data are from the 
U.S. decennial census. If we restrict the analysis to data from the 1970s 
to the present we observe that the U.S. population has become increas-
ingly foreign born, from about 5 percent to 12 percent of the U.S. popu-
lation. However, a longer-run view reveals that during the late 1800s 
and early 1900s, an even greater percentage of the U.S. population was 
foreign born, hovering at 15 percent. 
Economic history provides us with many examples of globaliza-
tion from earlier time periods that parallel the process we see occurring 
today. For example, Molina (2008) suggests that legal changes with 
respect to China, both in 1882 and in 2001, in turn impacted Mexican-
U.S. migratory fl ows in substantial ways. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 
1882, which effectively shut down Chinese immigration to the United 
States, was followed by a substantial rise in Mexican immigrants to the 
United States, presumably due to labor shortages caused by the exclu-
sion of Chinese labor. One hundred twenty years later, the acceptance 
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of China into the World Trade Organization seems to have had a simi-
lar impact, that of stimulating Mexican-U.S. immigration. With China 
a formal member of the world trading system, the relative competi-
tiveness of Mexican industry seems to have been reduced, causing an 
excess supply of Mexican labor. The excess supply seems to have found 
an outlet in the U.S. labor market, which proved relatively eager to 
absorb that Mexican labor. Hence both in 1882 and in 2001, changes in 
immigration statutes with respect to Chinese nationals have impacted 
Mexico-U.S. economic fl ows. The interactions across countries that we 
observe today and are attributed to “globalization” are similarly found 
in yesterday’s world.  
Another example of economic integration both in the past and today 
is with respect to workers’ remittances. As of late, the popular press has 
consistently reported on the large fl ows of immigrants’ earnings that are 
sent to their home communities (DeParle 2007, 2008). The main point 
in these articles is that these fl ows of money have not been adequately 
recognized in the past, in part because they were relatively small and 
Figure 3.4  Percentage of U.S. Population That Is Foreign Born

















SOURCE: Author’s calculations from Carter et al. (2006, Series Ad354, Aa2).
up10sagaidch3.indd   42 6/22/2010   2:35:55 PM
International Migration, Remittances, and Economic Development   43
have only recently been of much signifi cance. But the notion that remit-
tances were not important or signifi cant in earlier time periods is not 
corroborated by the historical data I have collected on Italian remit-
tances. Figure 3.5 shows the ratio of remittances sent by Italian emi-
grants relative to Italian GNP in order to measure the relative size of 
the fl ows over time.3 The fi gure shows averages of this ratio for each 
decade from the 1860s through the 1930s. Around the turn of the cen-
tury, cross-border money fl ows from Italian-origin immigrants to their 
families remaining in Italy accounted for about 4 or 5 percent of Italian 
national income. The remarkable aspect of this value is that remittances 
to Mexico are currently considered to be at their highest, but not even 
reaching 3 percent of Mexico’s national income.4 Hence, in relation 
to national income, remittances were more important to Italy in 1900 
than they are to Mexico today, even though the levels of remittances to 
Mexico now are considered to be extraordinarily large and newsworthy. 
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GLOBALIZATION MANIFESTS ITSELF DIFFERENTLY 
TODAY RELATIVE TO YESTERDAY
There is considerable evidence that the interchange of goods, the 
migrations of people, and the international fl ows of fi nancial assets 
have a long economic history. The case can be made, however, that 
today’s interactions differ in important respects from the interactions of 
economies yesterday. Technological advances have changed the nature 
of international trade and the context in which immigration, emigra-
tion, and international money fl ows take place. This section discusses 
how two economic sectors—transportation and communication—have 
affected the globalization process. 
While commentaries today tend to suggest that the observed 
increased trade globalization is a result of changes in the willingness of 
countries to open up to foreign markets (such as through the formation 
of global, regional, and bilateral trade liberalization pacts), economic 
historians are placing more weight on technological change as the main 
driving force. It has become substantially cheaper to transport goods, 
people, and ideas today than it was a century ago, and these reduc-
tions in costs are generally attributed to technological advances. Figure 
3.6 displays Mohammed and Williamson’s (2004) calculations of a real 
global tramp shipping price index, showing that shipping rates in 1994 
were about one-third of 1870 rates in real terms. These reduced trans-
portation costs have certainly played a role in allowing trading patterns 
to become more complex, to involve more nations, and to change direc-
tion at a moment’s notice. 
While declining transportation costs have played an important role 
in stimulating trade, they also are responsible for inducing increased 
fl ows of people, ideas, and fi nancial assets. Lower transportation costs, 
of course, make migration more likely due to the easing of fi nancial bur-
dens associated with moving from one country to another, but there are 
other channels by which declining transportation costs promote migra-
tion. Lower transportation costs ease the pain and risks that accompany 
migration, inducing more migration to take place. If the migrant dis-
covers that work is not as plentiful or lucrative in the destination area, 
lower fares will permit the return of the migrant to her point of origin or 
to another destination. The reversibility of migration is likely to induce 
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a greater volume of fl ows and a more diverse set of migrants. Tempo-
rary immigrants are likely to be more plentiful, and migrants can afford 
to travel farther away. Cheaper fares also promote tourism and the abil-
ity to learn about other unfamiliar regions of the world, facilitating sub-
sequent migration. But most importantly for our focus, reduced trans-
portation costs encourage continued interactions of migrants with their 
home communities, which is important for economic development—a 
point I argue in the next section. 
While reductions in transportation costs have signifi cantly facili-
tated the transport of goods and people, reductions in communication 
costs have been even more substantial and have likely resulted in even 
greater changes in global economic relations. Table 3.1 displays tele-
phone rates for New York to London and New York to Buenos Aires 
(for a three-minute call) from the inception of telephone service in 
that market to 1981. The fi rst two columns report nominal telephone 
rates, while the third and fourth columns express those same rates in 
real terms.5 The infl ation-indexed series indicates that transatlantic calls 
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were 130 times more expensive in 1927 relative to calls made in 1981. 
While the 1927 rate appears to be fantastically high, one must recall 
the capital stock that went into providing one telephone conversation at 
that time. For example, when telephone service was initiated from New 
York to San Francisco in 1915, the system could accommodate only one 
conversation at a time (Field 2006). 
The ease with which migrants can now keep in touch with individu-
als living far away has substantially changed the relations that migrants 
have with the family members that did not accompany them. Migrants’ 
ties with the home community are stronger and longer-lasting, with bet-
ter information fl ows in both directions. Migrants can remain abreast 
of the continuing or the sporadic needs of the family back home. News 
of sickness, marriages, or business opportunities can now be quickly 
and relatively cheaply communicated. Money transfers, whether from 
migrant to family or family to migrant, are easily tracked and made 
more secure by the ability of the sender to pair the money transfer with 
a telephone call to the recipient.6 And regardless of the migrant’s or the 
family’s ability to read and write, communication is easy and readily 
accessible. 
In their study of international trade, Freund and Weinhold (2004) 
fi nd that the Internet has increased the rate of growth of exports. It 
is logical to also presume that the Internet has changed the nature of 
human migration. It has vastly increased the ability of individuals, with 
or without migration networks, to secure pertinent information prior to 
migration. By obtaining such information, migrants increase the odds 
of having a successful migration. The Internet has also vastly reduced 
the costs of keeping in contact with family and friends left behind. This 
is likely to ease the pain of separation, further inducing migratory fl ows. 
In sum, lower transportation costs and communications costs due to 
technological advances have had signifi cant impacts on the environment 
in which international migration takes place. Lower transportation costs 
allow, of course, for a greater volume of overall migration, but also for 
more return migration. More temporary or short-term migration is also 
encouraged since migrants require smaller rewards in order to recover 
the costs of moving from one region of the world to another. Advances 
in communications technology keep migrants informed of home events, 
of the everyday or acute needs of the family, strengthening family and 
community migration networks, even among the illiterate. 
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Table 3.1  Nominal and Real Telephone Rates from the Beginning of 
Telephone Service to 1981
Nominal prices for a 
3-minute call from NY to:
Real prices for a 3-minute 
call from NY to:
Year London Buenos Aires London Buenos Aires
1927 75.0 — 793.1 —
1928 45.0 — 484.2 —
1929 45.0 — 484.2 —
1930 30.0 36.0 330.5 396.6
1931 30.0 30.0 363.1 363.1
1932 30.0 30.0 402.9 402.9
1934 30.0 30.0 411.9 411.9
1936 21.0 21.0 277.9 277.9
1937 21.0 21.0 268.3 268.3
1939 21.0 15.0 277.9 198.5
1940 21.0 15.0 276.0 197.1
1941 21.0 15.0 262.8 187.7
1944 21.0 12.0 219.5 125.4
1945 12.0 12.0 122.6 122.6
1946 12.0 12.0 113.2 113.2
1952 12.0 12.0 83.3 83.3
1959 12.0 12.0 75.8 75.8
1960 12.0 12.0 74.5 74.5
1965 12.0 12.0 70.0 70.0
1967 12.0 12.0 66.1 66.1
1968 12.0 12.0 63.4 63.4
1970 9.6 12.0 45.5 56.9
1972 9.6 12.0 42.2 52.8
1973 9.6 12.0 39.7 49.7
1974 3.6 8.0 13.4 29.8
1975 3.6 8.0 12.3 27.3
1976 3.6 8.0 11.6 25.8
1977 3.6 8.0 10.9 24.2
1978 4.5 8.0 12.6 22.5
1980 4.8 7.0 10.7 15.7
1981 3.0 4.5 6.0 9.1
NOTE: Real prices are expressed in 2003 dollars. See note 5 for details. 
SOURCE: Nominal telephone rates are from Carter et al. (2006). Real telephone rates 
are computed by the author applying a consumer price index from the same source.  
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GLOBALIZATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
This section discusses a sampling of the channels by which migra-
tion and its by-products impact economic development. These channels 
have been fortifi ed by the dramatic decreases in transportation costs 
that we have observed and by the improvements in communications 
technologies that continue to this date. These have greatly facilitated 
migration and the continued interactions between migrants living afar 
and the family back home. I begin with a discussion of migration’s 
impact on economic growth in origin communities and follow with how 
emigrants’ by-products affect growth and development back home. 
Cheaper transportation and better communications across countries 
help to lower barriers to migration and therefore have the potential to 
greatly expand the level of temporary international migration that takes 
place. Take, for example, the nearly threefold increase in foreign student 
enrollments in the United States (from 1.4 percent of all U.S. students 
for the 1954–1955 academic year to 3.9 percent of U.S. higher educa-
tion enrollment during the 2006–2007 academic year [Institute of Inter-
national Education 2006]). Undoubtedly, lower transportation costs 
and the ease with which parents and students can communicate despite 
great distances has aided in that growth. Reductions in nonpecuniary 
and monetary costs must improve the cost-benefi t ratio, encouraging 
foreign study, the subsequent return home, and the eventual transmis-
sion, to poor countries, of technical and scientifi c expertise by students 
originating from those countries. 
The contribution toward economic development that students can 
make when they study abroad is not limited to the human capital that 
they repatriate home at the conclusion of their sojourn at universities 
abroad. Networks are created between these students and their profes-
sors, between international and domestic students, and between interna-
tional students from one country and international students from other 
countries. In today’s world, these networks are likely to prove stronger 
and longer lasting given the variety of ways by which we cheaply com-
municate to most areas of the world. Foreign study by students, there-
fore, results in the fl ow of knowledge and expertise to poor countries. 
This continued fl ow is especially possible today given the advent of 
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nearly costless forms of communication such as e-mail and Voice over 
Internet Protocol. 
At this juncture it is appropriate to ask whether poor countries also 
pay a price for the facilitated fl ow of students across countries. While it 
may be easier for students to fl ow from poor countries to rich countries 
to acquire education, the fl ow also can go in the other direction. Individ-
uals who have already received training or education in poor countries 
emigrate to richer countries with hopes of higher wages and expanded 
opportunities. This results in “brain drain,” weakening the prospects 
for development in poorer regions of the world as these nations lose 
scarce human capital. This concern is of paramount importance given 
that, as of late, developed countries have modifi ed their immigration 
policies to favor skilled immigration over family reunifi cation immi-
gration, stimulating the exodus of educated individuals from all areas 
of the globe. Given the expected income differentials to migration, the 
highly educated from poorer regions of the world are particularly moti-
vated. The origin communities are not only deprived of talented indi-
viduals, they are also put into the position of subsidizing human capital 
acquisition that ultimately benefi ts rich nations, since in many cases the 
education is acquired at the developing country’s expense. For exam-
ple, one estimate for 2004 suggests that 26 percent of Somali-trained 
physicians practice abroad. During that same year there were 4 physi-
cians per 100,000 persons in Somalia, a far cry from the U.S. ratio of 
300 physicians per 100,000 population (Docquier and Bhargava 2006). 
The possibility that easier emigration can strip poor countries of scarce 
resources that are important for development is a real concern. 
On the fl ip side of the brain drain debate is the argument that the 
emigration of the highly educated leads to “brain gain.” If there is the 
possibility of out-migration of the more highly educated (because of 
the possibility of accruing higher returns for one’s talents and expertise 
abroad), there will be greater competition for the “emigration slots,” 
leading to increases in overall investments in human capital accumu-
lation as individuals attempt to distinguish themselves from others 
vying for visas. Stark, Helmenstein, and Prskawetz (1997) argue that 
the resulting brain gain exceeds the brain loss. Others, including Schiff 
(2006), disagree that the gains are greater than the losses and see the 
emigration of the highly skilled as generally disadvantaging the labor-
exporting nations. 
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Individuals who emigrate on a temporary basis can also bring home 
expertise acquired in ways other than through formal education. For 
example, McCormick and Wahba (2001) fi nd that temporary emigrants 
who have worked abroad in previously unfamiliar labor markets return 
home not only with capital to begin new businesses, but also with entre-
preneurial abilities from that experience. By observing other forms of 
“doing business” and other uses of technology, emigrants learn how to 
become more fl exible and to take advantage of opportunities that may 
await them in the communities to which they return. 
Foreign direct investment has also vastly expanded in today’s world, 
and it is often credited with promoting economic development in capital-
poor countries. But the acquisition of physical capital isn’t the only 
channel by which growth is stimulated when FDI takes place. Top-level 
managers, scientists, and engineers from the home offi ce often accom-
pany FDI. In the process of putting in place the physical capital—
manufacturing the goods for sale and delivering the fi rm’s services—
the home offi ce employees tend to transfer technology and know-how 
from countries that tend to be well-endowed with these resources to 
more poorly endowed areas. 
Social remittances, “a local-level, migration-driven form of cul-
tural diffusion,” is yet another avenue by which migration may infl u-
ence economic development (Levitt 1998). Return migrants resettling 
back home share ideas, technology, expectations, and familiarity with 
foreign institutions and foreign markets, which in turn can facilitate 
economic development. Those who visit home temporarily and com-
municate often with their families may also be helping to lift their home 
countries from poverty.7 
Emigration has also been found to stimulate trade in goods and 
services between pairs of labor exporting and labor importing nations 
(Mundra 2005). This type of international trade is sometimes referred to 
as “nostalgic trade.” Mexican immigrants in the United States yearning 
for traditional foods and beverages demand these in the U.S. market-
place, stimulating merchandise trade and promoting agricultural pro-
duction back home. After a while, these products can become known 
and favored by the host country population and stimulate that trade on a 
broader basis, as in the case of the popularity of Mexican cuisine in the 
United States today. 
up10sagaidch3.indd   50 6/22/2010   2:35:57 PM
International Migration, Remittances, and Economic Development   51
An extremely important by-product of migration is the fl ow of 
money that immigrants send home. These are referred to as workers’ 
remittances and have gained the interest of bankers, academicians, and 
government policymakers. On a number of levels these fl ows have been 
credited with stimulating economic development.
Earlier we established that temporary migration is likely to be stim-
ulated by the dramatic decreases that have taken place with respect to 
transportation costs. Likewise, by easing the continuation of contacts 
among families separated by long distances, reductions in communica-
tions costs make migration for the purpose of earning money abroad 
much more palatable. In short, increases in temporary migration to 
earn wages in a geographically distant land increase the fl ow of remit-
tances across borders. In addition, given that money transfers today 
are less costly and more secure, it is more likely that resources fl ow 
back home on a periodic basis. The receipt of remittances can contrib-
ute toward economic development by compensating for liquidity con-
straints often encountered in poorer regions of the world. Remittances 
have been linked to investments in existing businesses in the Domini-
can Republic as measured by Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006), 
while Woodruff and Zenteno (2007) fi nd that the existence of migra-
tion networks (which they presume signals greater access to remittance 
receipts) appears to increase profi ts and capital investment in Mexican 
microenterprises located in urban areas. Remittances have also been 
linked to increases in educational investments in a number of studies, 
including studies using Haitian, Dominican, and El Salvadorian data. 
(See Amuedo-Dorantes, Georges, and Pozo [forthcoming]; Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo [2009]; and Edwards and Ureta [2003], respectively.) 
Remittances have also been credited with reducing the incidence 
of “sudden stops” of capital infl ows (Bugamelli and Paterno 2005). 
Countries that experience large infl ows of remittances are thought to 
be less vulnerable to economic recessions and global crises given the 
belief that substantial levels of these fl ows are motivated by altruism. 
Altruistic infl ows will tend to be countercyclical, reducing the damage 
that foreign investors may impart when they become concerned with 
a poorly performing economy and withdraw resources. The counter-
cyclical nature of the fl ows from the emigrants who remit are likely to 
be stronger if they are better informed about the immediate situation and 
the economic needs of their families back home. If the emigrants know 
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that times are bad for their families, they will remit more. And as they 
learn that economic recovery is on the way, they are likely to remit less. 
It is logical to assume that cheaper and better communications have 
led to improvements in the timing of altruistic remittance infl ows so 
that they can better serve in this countercyclical manner. Consequently, 
it is plausible that remittances reduce the threat of currency crises. 
Foreign investors are less likely to behave in ways that destabilize the 
currency in the face of this vast force of remitters who will naturally 
provide resources to the family back home as unfavorable shocks hit 
the economy. 
Remittances have also been found to encourage the development of 
infrastructures that facilitate development. Demirgüc-Kunt et al. (2009) 
purport to fi nd that the channelling of substantial sums of money by 
emigrants to their families in Mexico has provided incentives for fi nan-
cial intermediaries to locate in the migrant sending areas. Financial 
intermediaries are in effect taking advantage of increased demand for 
services that result from the money infl ows that emigrants send home. 
This is especially important in the case of Mexico, given that there has 
traditionally been relatively more out-migration in Mexico’s rural and 
less-developed areas of the country—the same areas that traditionally 
have been ignored by the banking system. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Globalization has been progressing for some time, rising and fall-
ing, but it is certainly not unique to our times. The perception that 
growth in these economic interactions is of only recent vintage might 
originate from limiting ourselves to examining data from the latter half 
of the twentieth century, where these patterns are not obvious, driv-
ing us to conclude that globalization is a product of the past 50 or so 
years. In contrast, once we examine data from earlier time periods, we 
fi nd that globalization through trade, fi nance, and migration has a much 
longer history.
While the globalization process was certainly born before the past 
half century, there appear to be differences in the interactions of coun-
tries today relative to yesterday that are worth dwelling on. This chapter 
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focuses on international migration in particular, pointing to the context 
in which migration took place in the past relative to today. Technological 
advances have translated into widespread reductions in transportation 
and international communications costs. Migrants, potential migrants, 
and the families living back home all have access to much better infor-
mation, reducing the risks involved with migration and increasing the 
fl ow of information between families living in different parts of the 
world. This has the potential to greatly improve the lives of migrants, 
their families, and the communities from which migrants originate. 
Lower transportation and communications costs today keep emi-
grants abreast of events back home. Emigrants and the families from 
which they originate can easily and cheaply maintain ties with one 
another. Migrants know what is happening back home and what the 
needs of the family may be on a day-to-day basis. The families that 
remain in the home community have clearer perceptions of the lives 
and activities of their family abroad. In earlier time periods, these com-
munications were less accessible and likely caused greater numbers of 
migrants to lose touch with their families back home, leading to lower 
fl ows of resources back home and fewer instances of the return of infor-
mation that could be used to stimulate economic development. 
It is interesting that there have been substantial calls for globaliza-
tion in some dimensions and calls for restrictions in others. While argu-
ments are made in favor of unimpeded fl ows of capital and of goods 
across countries, the same cannot be said about people fl ows. Econo-
mists often lobby for the free fl ow of capital from areas where capital is 
abundant and earning lower returns to areas where capital is scarce and 
earning higher returns, but we do not as often and as vigorously argue 
that labor should move from areas where its return is lower to areas 
where its return is higher. While we tend to claim that international 
trade in goods and services is not a zero-sum game, but rather benefi ts 
both importing and exporting nations in the aggregate, we do not as 
consistently attribute likewise to the migrations of people. 
Despite the impediments to migration that we tend to observe, 
technological changes that have swept the transportation and commu-
nications sectors are likely to continue, propelling growth in migratory 
fl ows and their by-products. It is up to us to make the most of the poten-
tial gains from the movement of resources to areas where they reap the 
greatest gain, helping to free communities from poverty. 
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Notes
 1. For a discussion of the comparability of pre- and postwar data for the United 
States, see Romer (1986).
 2.  For example, see Lemaitre (2005) for a discussion of the harmonization of migra-
tion statistics across countries and Alexander, Cady, and Gonzalez-Garcia (2008) 
for discussion of the IMF’s extensive program on data standards, harmonization, 
and dissemination. 
 3.  I obtained nominal infl ows of remittances to Italy from Cinel’s (1991) historical 
account of Italian emigration, its impacts and by-products over the 1860 through 
1930 period. Cinel does not provide remittance amounts for each year. Data on 
Italian GNP were obtained from Mitchell (1998). I computed a remittance to GNP 
value for each decade using the data that were available within each decade. 
 4. The Mexican Central Bank reports that remittances to Mexico were US$23,969.5 
million in 2007 while its GDP stood at US$893,364 million. Remittances there-
fore accounted for only 2.68 percent of Mexico’s national income. 
 5.  Nominal telephone rates (for a three-minute call) are from Historical Statistics of 
the United States, series Dg60 and Dg63. Real telephone rates are computed by 
the author applying consumer price index series Cc1 from the same source. Given 
the base of the series, the rates are therefore expressed in 2003 dollars. 
 6.  In some markets, Western Union’s money transfer fee includes a three-minute 
telephone call from the sender of money to the money recipient. The call can be 
used, for example, to advise the recipient of the transfer, the amount being trans-
ferred, and how to retrieve it. 
 7. Social remittance can also transfer undesirable habits and culture that can have 
detrimental impacts on growth and development, as in the case of the rise of 
gang violence thought to be imported to Central America from Los Angeles. See 
Archibold (2007).
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